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Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent con￿ ict between two tasks
performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the
product￿ s ￿suitability￿for the speci￿c needs of customers. When structuring sales-
force compensation, ￿rms trade o⁄ the expected losses from ￿misselling￿unsuitable
products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize
how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention)
depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a
￿rm￿ s sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness
of its agents￿sales incentives.
JEL Classi￿cation: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Infor-
mation and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation
Methods and Their E⁄ects).
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2013, USA. E-mail: m-ottaviani@northwestern.edu.When purchasing unfamiliar products, consumers often rely on information and advice
provided by representatives of the seller. This creates the possibility of ￿misselling,￿the
questionable practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer￿ s
speci￿c needs.1 This problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex
products, such as consumer electronics, auto repairs, medical services, and retail ￿nancial
products including securities, pensions, insurance policies, and mortgages. An important
feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent,
rather than directly.
For example, brokers typically recommend purchase of a speci￿c product after inquir-
ing about their customers￿particular circumstances and needs. The possibility of abuse
has led to regulation in some of these markets, most notably for securities transactions.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA, the major self-regulatory organi-
zation for securities ￿rms operating in the United States) mandates that brokers-dealers
make a reasonable e⁄ort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their
(non-institutional) customers and to ensure that their recommendations are ￿suitable￿to
customers￿￿nancial situations and needs.2 Firms that make unsuitable recommendations
are sanctioned through FINRA disciplinary procedures.3
1The code of conduct for the employees of a major bank (￿ Group Code of Conduct: Leading by Ex-
ample,￿ Standard Chartered Bank, 2005) reports the following apt illustration: ￿Typically, mis-selling is
associated with investment products when there may have been a failure to disclose all the associated risks
or where an investment product is inappropriate to a customer￿ s needs. For example, a product with a
long tenor [sic] (eg ten years) may have a guaranteed repayment of principal only on maturity date, but
if prematurely liquidated it may not repay the full principal. This may result in mis selling if it is sold to
customer who may have had a short term need for cash or to a customer who is 70 years old.￿
2FINRA was formed in 2007 through a consolidation of the enforcement arm of the New York Stock
Exchange, NYSE Regulation, Inc., and the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD). NASD Con-
duct Rule 2310(a) ￿ Recommendation to Customers (Suitability),￿originally adopted in 1939, prescribes:
￿In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have
reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis
of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his ￿nancial
situation and needs.￿Added in 1991, Rule 2310(b) ￿ Broker￿ s Duty of Inquiry￿further requires: ￿Prior to
the execution of a transaction recommended to a non-institutional customer, other than transactions with
customers where investments are limited to money market mutual funds, a member shall make reason-
able e⁄orts to obtain information concerning: (1) the customer￿ s ￿nancial status; (2) the customer￿ s tax
status; (3) the customer￿ s investment objectives; and (4) such other information used or considered to be
reasonable by such member or registered representative in making recommendations to the customer.￿In
addition, Rule 3010 imposes a duty of supervision on the ￿rm employing the broker-dealer.
3According to Lewis Lowenfels and Alan R. Bromberg (1999), ￿unsuitability claims are the most
common and yet the most ambiguous of all customer claims.￿Regulatory bodies may, in addition, support
customers who claim compensation. Such compensation can be substantial, as witnessed by recent high-
pro￿le misselling scandals following the liberalization of the U.K. ￿nancial industry in the 1980s. After a
full review of private pension sales in 1994, ￿nancial institutions reportedly paid out a total compensation
1This paper analyzes the possibility of misselling through the lens of the agency rela-
tionship between the selling ￿rm and its salesforce. We argue that the risk of misselling is
particularly acute when the ￿rm hires the same agents to both prospect for new customers
and provide product advice. When the ￿rm provides steeper incentives￿ for example, be-
cause the presence of more ￿rms makes it harder for agents to locate new customers￿ then
agents will be more tempted to in￿ ate the perceived value of the product, or to recommend
purchase even if the product is inappropriate for the customers they identify.
At the heart of our model lies a multi-task problem that is inherent to the practice
of direct marketing. An agent who markets a product directly to customers must ￿rst
prospect for potential customers and interest them in the product, and second advise cus-
tomers on the suitability of the product (including the provision of accurate information).
The incentives necessary to induce search e⁄ort subsequently tempt the agent to advise
purchase indiscriminately.
Firms that missell through their own employees may be held vicariously liable or may
damage their reputation with customers. Similarly, when misselling takes place through
independent intermediaries, ￿rms risk being sued or facing regulatory sanctions (including
loss of license). Therefore, ￿rms should have a vital interest in ensuring that their agents
comply with the chosen standard of advice. However, ensuring compliance is costly for
the ￿rm, as it may require internal reviews or result in rents for the agents.4 Through
the use of contingent commissions, which are clawed back in cases of alleged misselling or
when dissatis￿ed customers cancel a contract, the resulting agency cost to the ￿rm can be
reduced.5
We show that an agent￿ s expected cost of prospecting for customers, the internal organi-
zation of a ￿rm￿ s sales process, and the transparency of the commission structure all a⁄ect
the ￿rm￿ s own tolerance towards misselling. Importantly, it is only through the agency
of £12 billion. Compensation is still being paid for the misselling of endowment mortgages, which bundle
mortgages with risky investments. See also footnote 22.
4Sellers can use a number of internal controls to monitor agents and to limit their discretion when
making recommendations to customers. For example, sellers use internal compliance o¢ cers and Customer
Relationship Management (CRM) systems to regularly audit their agents￿￿fact ￿nds.￿The audit trail for
the transaction allows the seller to monitor the agent￿ s performance more easily and to resolve disputes
over allegations of misselling.
5In an extension of the baseline model, we show that agency costs may be limited further if advisers
are relieved (to some extent) of the task of prospecting for customers (for example, when bank managers
are only advising incoming clients in a bank￿ s local branch, while client tra¢ c is driven by the bank￿ s
marketing campaign).
2relationship that these factors a⁄ect the potential for misselling. Casting the ￿rm as an
entrepreneurial entity instead￿ akin to a self-employed lawyer or doctor, as in the extant
literature on credence goods￿ overlooks the role played by these factors. As we argue, this
could be particularly problematic in evaluating the scope of possible policy intervention,
say through imposing regulations or probing into cases of alleged misselling. In addition,
while the presence of the internal agency problem strengthens the case for intervention, it
also calls for policymakers and regulators to adopt a more ￿ne-tuned approach￿ for exam-
ple, by adapting their response to the organization of the sales process and the prevailing
intensity of competition.
In our model, the price of the product is determined endogenously. On the one hand,
the suitability standard that customers expect to prevail a⁄ects the maximum price they
are willing to pay. On the other hand, the price also a⁄ects the ￿rm￿ s incentives to expand
sales by tolerating a lower suitability standard. Even though customers do not observe the
agent￿ s incentives in our baseline scenario, they have correct expectations in equilibrium
about the commission structure and the resulting suitability standard.
Given that the expectation of misselling reduces customers￿willingness to pay, the ￿rm
would bene￿t ex ante from committing to pay ex post penalties for misselling. Firms
might be able to achieve some commitment through self-regulatory organizations, such as
FINRA.6 However, we show that even when ￿rms have the same commitment power as a
policymaker, the suitability standard set under self-regulation is still too low from a welfare
perspective. In addition to imposing penalties for misselling, regulators could mandate
disclosure of the commissions paid to agents, as is becoming increasingly common in some
countries and markets.7 We show that the disclosure of commissions partly deters ￿rms
from lowering their standards. When observing that the ￿rm o⁄ers less steep incentives
to the agent, customers are reassured that the suitability standard has increased; hence,
they are willing to pay more, to the bene￿t of the ￿rm.
As more ￿nancial decisions end up in the hands of consumers, for example with the
shift from de￿ned bene￿t pension plans to 401(k) plans in the United States, regula-
6While SEC regulation requires that all brokers-dealers belong to a self-regulatory organization, in
other markets membership in such organizations is voluntary. For example, insurance brokers can apply
for membership in the Insurance Marketplace Standards Association (IMSA), a voluntary self-regulatory
organization active in setting and enforcing ethical standards for the sale of individual life insurance,
long-term care insurance, and annuities.
7See Section 6.
3tors are grappling with the interaction between product providers, advising agents, and
consumers￿ Howell E. Jackson￿ s (2007) ￿trilateral dilemma.￿ 8 As is common for the re-
tailing of ￿nancial services, the U.S. mortgage industry also relies heavily on third-party
agents.9 In the context of our model, we analyze how agents￿compensation and suitability
standards change as ￿rms resell contracts (such as loans)￿ a practice that is currently
attracting regulators￿attention. It remains to be seen how courts and policymakers will
deal with the fallout from the recent turmoil in the subprime mortgage market.
Beyond ￿nancial and insurance services, our model applies more broadly to situations
in which marketing agents are tempted to in￿ ate the perceived value of products.10 For
instance, a salesperson may praise certain features but hide others when trying to convince
a client to switch to a particular calling plan, or utility contract, either of which may be
su¢ ciently complex to make such deception successful.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the related literature.
Section 2 formulates the baseline model. Section 3 characterizes how the ￿rm should
optimally compensate the agent. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium that results when
the customer does not observe the agent￿ s compensation. Section 5 discusses the e⁄ect of
agency on the equilibrium outcome and on the scope for policy intervention. Section 6
turns to the equilibrium when the agent￿ s compensation scheme is transparent. Sections
7 to 9 extend the model to investigate the role of the internal organization of the sales
process, the possibility of contract resale, and the e⁄ect of changes in the amount of
competition for customers. Section 10 concludes. Appendix A presents a toy model of the
8Legal scholars are paying increasing attention to the role of contingent commissions and premiums in
the form of yield spread premiums to mortgage brokers, brokerage commissions in investment management,
contingent insurance commissions, or fees and kickbacks in real estate settlement transactions. These
commissions are feared to tempt advisors to ￿steer￿ clients to unsuitable products. See, for instance,
Jackson and Laurie Burlingame (2007) and, with a particular focus on contingent commissions, Daniel
Schwarcz (2007).
9In a comment on the causes of the current subprime mortgage crisis, The Economist observes that
￿[m]any [customers] appear to have been encouraged to take out loans by brokers more bothered about
their fees than their clients￿ability to repay their debts￿and that ￿[m]any of the riskiest mortgages were
made by independent, non-bank lenders.￿(￿ The trouble with the housing market￿(page 11) and ￿ America￿ s
housing market￿(page 79), March 24, 2007.)
10Section 2-315 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code requires that: ￿Where the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller￿ s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modi￿ed under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be ￿t for such purpose.￿
11See the discussion by the U.K. telecommunication regulator in ￿ Migration, Switching and Mis-selling,￿
Consultation Document, O¢ ce of Communications, February 16, 2006.
4two-task agency problem on which the baseline model developed in the paper builds. All
proofs are collected in Appendix B.
1 Literature
This paper contributes to the analysis of optimal compensation for a direct marketing
agent who must be incentivized simultaneously to sell and not to missell. When analyzing
the optimal compensation structure (salary and commission) for sales agents, the market-
ing literature has traditionally focused on the classic trade-o⁄ between risk-sharing and
incentives (see Amiya K. Basu, Rajiv Lal, V. Srinivasan, and Richard Staelin, 1985). A
notable exception is Ajay Kalra, Mengze Shi, and Kannan Srinivasan (2003), who model
a ￿rm￿ s ability to signal product quality to customers through the (observable) choice of
commission paid to its salesforce. In our model instead, the sales agent has private infor-
mation about the match of the product with customer needs, whereas the ￿rm does not
have direct access to this information.
Our model hinges on the con￿ ict between a sales agent￿ s incentives to prospect for
customers and to provide adequate advice. The compensation needed to elicit e⁄ort on
one task (prospecting for customers) creates a con￿ ict of interest between the ￿rm and the
agent on the second task (providing adequate advice). This con￿ ict generates a multi-task
agency problem (Bengt Holmstr￿m and Paul Milgrom, 1991), analogous to the problems
analyzed in di⁄erent environments by Steven D. Levitt and Christopher M. Snyder (1997)
and Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1999).12
An important ingredient of our model is the communication game between the agent
and the customer. In our setting, the con￿ ict of interest between agent and customer arises
endogenously from the agent￿ s compensation set by the ￿rm. In most of the literature
on strategic information transmission and delegation (e.g., Vincent Crawford and Joel
Sobel, 1982, Wouter Dessein, 2002, and Ricardo Alonso and Niko Matouschek, 2008), this
preference divergence is given exogenously.13
12See Section 6.2 in Patrick Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for an exposition of the multi-task problem,
and in particular Section 6.22 for an application to incentives for selling two imperfectly substitutable
products.
13Other models that analyze ￿delegated expertise￿are Richard A. Lambert (1986), Joel S. Demski and
David E.M. Sappington (1987), Tracy R. Lewis and Sappington (1997), Luis Garicano and Tano Santos
(2004), and Denis Gromb and David Martimort (2007). Furthermore, a trade-o⁄ between high-powered
incentives to induce e⁄ort and biased decision-making is also analyzed in Susan Athey and John Roberts
5Our assumption that the principal (the ￿rm) bears responsibility for the actions of its
agents has been investigated more broadly in the literature on vicarious liability (see for
example Rohan Pitchford, 1995, and Yeon-Koo Che and Kathryn E. Spier, 2006). More
generally, our paper analyzes policy intervention when the targeted action￿ the quality
of advice in our setting￿ is not carried out directly by the targeted ￿rm, but rather it is
delegated to agents. As we ￿nd, consideration of the ￿rm￿ s internal agency problem is
crucial to determining the role for policy intervention.
Consideration of the ￿rm￿ s agency problem is novel to the literature on credence and
experience goods, following Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni (1973).14 In their analysis
of information provision incentives by sellers of ￿nancial products, Bolton, Xavier Freixas,
and Joel Shapiro (2007) compare the performance of di⁄erent organizational structures
(one-stop versus universal banking), but they do not consider the agency problem that
is internal to the selling ￿rm. When analyzing the choice of anti-fraud standards by a
self-regulatory organization, Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman, and Kathleen M.
Hagerty (2005) also abstract from the agency problem between the seller and its agents.
By focusing on this agency problem, we highlight the two-way interaction between the
internal organization of the sales process and the regulatory framework.15
2 Model
Consider a risk-neutral ￿rm selling a single product through a risk-neutral agent who is
asked to both prospect for customers and advise them. The agent is protected by limited
liability, and hence can only receive positive compensation from the ￿rm. By exerting sales
e⁄ort at private disutility cS > 0, the agent contacts a potential customer with probability
￿ > 0.16
(2001) and Dessein, Garicano, and Robert Gertner (2006).
14See Uwe Dulleck and Rudolf Kerschbamer (2006) for a recent survey of the theoretical literature. In
an empirical study of the vehicle inspection market, Thomas N. Hubbard (1998) shows that customers are
less likely to obtain a favorable inspection at chain stores than at independent garages, service stations,
new-car dealers, and tune-up shops. His evidence is consistent with ￿rms acting less in customers￿interests
when the agency problem is more severe.
15In their factual account of the U.K. pension misselling scandal, Julia Black and Richard Nobles (1998)
also stress this interaction, which works from regulation and policy to ￿rms￿optimal strategy choice and
vice versa.
16Think of the agent as either contacting previous clients or prospecting for new customers. The cost
cS may be required to make customers aware of the existence of the (possibly new) product.
6In addition, the agent assists customers in deciding whether the product (or service)
is suitable for their speci￿c needs. To capture the uncertainty about the match between
customer preferences and product characteristics, we stipulate that there are two customer
types, ￿ = l;h. A customer of type ￿ derives utility u￿ from acquiring the product, with
ul < 0 < uh.17 We allow for the ￿rm￿ s cost of serving the customer, k￿ > 0, to be type
dependent.18 Given this speci￿cation, a sale made to a type-l customer results in both net
loss for the customer and ine¢ ciency from a welfare perspective.
The prior probability that ￿ = h is given by 0 < q < 1, which is also the only
information the customer has about the type. The agent privately observes a noisy pre-
sale signal s 2 [0;1] about the customer￿ s type.19 Without further loss of generality,
we stipulate that s is realized according to the type-dependent distribution functions F￿,
where Fh dominates Fl in the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) order. We assume that
the densities f￿(s) are continuous and strictly positive in the interior s 2 (0;1), so that
the posterior probability q(s) = Pr[￿ = h j s] is strictly increasing. Assuming further
that fh(1) > 0, fl(0) > 0, and fh(0) = fl(1) = 0, the signal is fully informative at the
boundaries: q(0) = 0 and q(1) = 1. It is convenient to de￿ne F(s) as the unconditional
distribution of the signal, with density f(s) := qfh(s) + (1 ￿ q)fl(s).
When contracting with the agent, the ￿rm cannot condition directly on the agent￿ s
e⁄ort or the customer￿ s type, because the ￿rm does not observe them. Instead, the ￿rm
can condition the agent￿ s compensation ￿rst on whether a sale has been made, and second
on a post-sale signal about the customer￿ s type. We specify that the post-sale signal reveals
with probability 0 <   < 1 whether a sale was made to a type-l customer. For instance,
the signal could originate from the complaints of disgruntled customers. In this case,  
corresponds to the conditional probability with which a sale to a type-l customer results
17Utilities are taken to be net of the respective next-best option. For instance, retail investment products
may have a particular risk-return pro￿le that is not optimal for all investors. Likewise, one product may
create a particular tax advantage, though possibly at the cost of higher risk.
18As discussed in more detail in Section 8, the ￿rm￿ s margin naturally depend on the customer￿ s type for
some ￿nancial products (such as mortgages or insurance contracts) and long-term service contracts (such
as calling plans or utility services￿ cf. footnote 11). The condition kl > kh may have particular relevance
for ￿nancial products such as mortgages (see footnote 47). The case with kl < kh may be applicable to
insurance products, where type-h customers could represent high-risk customers, who are more likely to
receive the contractually stipulated (pooling) indemnity. Finally, the case with k￿ = k should apply to
most physical goods.
19Because this is not key to our analysis, we also specify for the moment that this information is available
to the agent at no additional cost. See, however, Section 7.
7in a veri￿able complaint.20
A key parameter in our model is the expected penalty, ￿, that the ￿rm incurs from
(mis)selling to a type-l customer.21 This parameter captures the legal costs and the ￿nes
following prosecution for misselling, comprising compensation that must be made to cus-
tomers. In addition, the ￿rm may su⁄er a loss in reputation following alleged misselling.
In regulated sectors, the ￿rm may face the risk of losing its license, being brought under
closer regulatory scrutiny, or being less able to successfully contest future disciplinary ac-
tions for alleged misconduct.22 Note that because the signal s is noisy, even draconian
punishment (high ￿) could not ensure that only type-h customers will purchase. Instead,
because the ￿rm can be sure to sell only to type-h customers if and only if s = 1, the ￿rm
would close down its business if ￿ were su¢ ciently high.23
We stipulate that a fraction 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 of ￿ represents a compensatory transfer to the
customer. All of our results hold irrespective of the choice of ￿.
The timing is as follows:
1. The ￿rm sets the product price, p.
2. The ￿rm sets the compensation scheme for the agent.
3. The agent chooses whether to exert e⁄ort to prospect for a customer.
4. If the agent exerts e⁄ort, then a customer arrives with probability ￿.
5. The agent privately observes signal s about the customer￿ s type.
6. The agent advises the customer whether to purchase.
7. The customer decides whether to purchase at price p.
8. Conditional on a sale to a type-l customer, the ￿rm observes a negative signal with
probability  .
9. Conditional on a sale to a type-l customer, the ￿rm pays an expected penalty ￿, a
fraction ￿ of which is rebated to the customer.
A key building block of the model is the communication game between the agent and
20In footnote 29 we argue that our results are robust to alternative speci￿cations of the monitoring
technology, provided that the post-sale signal is noisy.
21The likelihood that disgruntled customers lodge complaints, or that su¢ cient information of alleged
misselling surfaces, may be low. Still, ￿ may be substantial if the imposed penalty is su¢ ciently large.
22As explained by Lowenfels and Bromberg (1999), FINRA and SEC suitability rules constitute an
￿ethical standard of due care and fair dealing between brokers and customers.￿Broker-dealers members
who violate NASD Conduct Rule 2310 (see footnote 2) are ￿ned and suspended. Customers may obtain
private damages only by demonstrating fraud or breach of ￿duciary duty, which typically implies a more
stringent burden of proof.
23In Section 5 we endogenize the choice of ￿.
8the customer that takes place at stages 5￿ 7. The agent￿ s preferences depend on the ￿rm￿ s
compensation scheme and thus will re￿ ect the preferences of the ￿rm. However, when
kl +￿ ￿ kh holds, ￿rm and customer interests are completely misaligned: the ￿rm bene￿ts
(weakly) more when selling to type-l customers, while type-h customers bene￿t strictly
more from a purchase. In this case, there is no equilibrium in which the customer follows
the agent￿ s advice. We therefore stipulate for now that kl + ￿ > kh.24 We will show that
in this case the agent￿ s recommendation results in the customer purchasing the product
whenever s 2 [s￿;1], where we refer to s￿ as the suitability standard.
By choosing the compensation scheme at stage 2, the ￿rm e⁄ectively induces the agent
to implement a particular suitability standard. Following Grossman and Hart￿ s (1983) two-
stage approach, Section 3 characterizes the ￿rm￿ s agency costs associated with any given
suitability standard. Section 4 then turns to the determination of the optimal standard.25
3 Agency Cost of Suitability
This section characterizes the compensation scheme that induces a direct marketing agent
to implement a given suitability standard s￿. We show that to implement a suitability
standard s￿ > 0, the seller must leave a positive rent to the agent￿ this rent corresponds
to the agency costs associated with the standard.
3.1 Incentive Constraints
The agent is protected by limited liability and has an outside option wage of zero. As
shown in Proposition 1, it is optimal for the seller to pay a zero wage when the post-sale
signal indicates a type-l customer.26 That leaves two compensation levels for the other
two veri￿able states: a wage of w if no sale is made, and a wage of w + b if a sale is made
24See also Section 5.
25The chosen formulation where the agent observes a continuous pre-sale signal allows us to capture the
￿rm￿ s strategy by a continuously chosen standard and to examine how the equilibrium standard depends
on the model￿ s parameters. Readers who are less familiar with the underlying multi-task agency problem
may wish to ￿rst consult Appendix A, which analyzes a toy version of the model in which the agent is
perfectly informed about the customer￿ s type.
26The result is not fully obvious because, in order to incentivize the agent to prospect for customers,
the ￿rm could pay a positive commission irrespective of whether a sale was subsequently contested (as
it is indeed optimal when implementing s￿ = 0). However, specifying a wage of zero when the post-sale
signal indicates a type-l customer allows the ￿rm to implement a given suitability standard s￿ > 0 at
lower overall wage costs. See the proof of Proposition 1.
9and no negative post-sale signal is received. We refer to w as the agent￿ s base salary and
to b as the agent￿ s additional commission (or bonus) for a sale.
From an uncontested sale, the agent obtains the commission b in addition to the salary
w. In contrast, the agent￿ s payo⁄is 0 when a sale is contested, which happens with proba-
bility   [1 ￿ q(s)].27 Conditional on observing signal s, the agent￿ s expected compensation
from a sale is then V (s) := [1 ￿   [1 ￿ q(s)]](w + b).
As long as w + b > 0 holds, which is clearly necessary to incentivize e⁄ort, V (s) is
strictly increasing in s. It is also continuous in s. If V (0) < w and V (1) > w hold,
there exists a cuto⁄ signal s￿ at which the agent is indi⁄erent between making a sale or
not: V (s￿) = w. Substituting from the de￿nition of V (s) and rearranging terms, this
requirement becomes
b
w
=
  [1 ￿ q(s￿)]
1 ￿   [1 ￿ q(s￿)]
: (1)
The ratio of commission to salary, b=w, must be lower if the ￿rm wants to ensure
compliance with a higher standard s￿. A higher commission b pushes s￿ down because it
induces the agent to advise more customers to purchase the product. In contrast, a higher
salary w pushes s￿ up because the agent is sure to obtain the salary w when advising a
customer not to purchase, but risks losing it otherwise. For a given standard s￿, condition
(1) can be satis￿ed with a lower salary w if a sale to a type-l customer is detected with a
higher probability  .
We turn now to the agent￿ s incentive constraint for prospecting for customers. By
exerting sales e⁄ort at private cost cS and subsequently applying a standard s￿, the agent
realizes a sale with probability ￿ times 1 ￿ F(s￿). Again noting that the agent earns the
salary w even without a sale, the agent￿ s incentive constraint at stage 3 becomes
￿
Z 1
s￿
[V (s) ￿ w]f(s)ds ￿ cS: (2)
To make exerting e⁄ort worthwhile to the agent, there must be a su¢ ciently large wedge
between the expected compensation from a sale and the salary.
A key feature of this model is that the ￿rm cannot compensate the agent independently
for the two tasks that are governed by the two incentive conditions in (1) and (2). The
agent may not sell to a customer for two reasons: either the agent failed to prospect for
27Our results are easily extended to the case in which only a strictly positive fraction ￿ > 0 of the
respective compensation w + b can be withheld or clawed back.
10a customer (which is a bad signal about the agent￿ s search e⁄ort), or the agent found a
customer and correctly advised against purchase (indicating proper search and advice).
This attribution problem creates a con￿ ict between the tasks of searching and advising.
3.2 Optimal Compensation
For a given choice of standard s￿, the optimal compensation contract (w;b) minimizes the
￿rm￿ s wage costs. It follows immediately from optimality that the incentive constraint (2)
must be binding. This can then be rewritten as
Z 1
s￿
[V (s) ￿ w]f(s)ds = ￿ :=
cS
￿
; (3)
where ￿ represents the agent￿ s expected cost to locate a single potential customer, given
that the agent￿ s e⁄ort leads to a contact with probability ￿. The higher ￿, the more
incentives the ￿rm must provide to induce the agent to exert e⁄ort.
Substituting (1) into (3), we can solve for the compensation scheme.
Proposition 1 To ensure the agent￿ s compliance to some standard s￿ > 0, the ￿rm￿ s
optimal incentive scheme prescribes the base salary
w =
￿[1 ￿   [1 ￿ q(s￿)]]
 
R 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
(4)
and the sales commission
b =
￿[1 ￿ q(s￿)]
R 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
: (5)
Because of the con￿ icting responsibilities of prospecting and advising, when s￿ > 0 the
agent obtains a positive rent equal to the salary w, which the agent can always secure, even
without exerting sales e⁄ort. The ￿rm￿ s expected wage cost thus equals cS +w, comprising
the agent￿ s expected compensation cS for sales e⁄ort and the rent w. To implement the
standard s￿ = 0 instead, the ￿rm would pay the agent a compensation equal to cS=￿
following a sale, regardless of the post-sale signal, thereby leaving no rent to the agent.28
28Consequently, under this contract the agent strictly prefers to make a sale for any observed signal.
In contrast, if we take the limit s￿ ! 0 for the contract characterized in Proposition 1, then the agent is
by construction made indi⁄erent betwen advising in favor of or against a purchase after observing s = 0.
Unless monitoring is perfect with   = 1, this implies that the respective agency costs w are strictly
bounded away from zero as s￿ ! 0.
11Proposition 2 The agent￿ s rent, w, increases in the suitability standard s￿, increases in
the agent￿ s expected sales cost ￿, and decreases in the quality   of the post-sale signal.
The ￿rm￿ s marginal cost of raising the standard, dw=ds￿, is strictly decreasing in   and
strictly increasing in ￿.
An increase in the suitability standard a⁄ects the agent￿ s incentives to prospect for
customers and to advise them. When the suitability standard is higher, any customer
contacted by the agent is less likely to purchase. To satisfy (3), the ￿rm therefore must
increase the commission b for any given salary w. As we know, however, increasing the
ratio b=w would work in the opposite direction, namely towards a reduction in s￿ (cf. (1)).
Consequently, to induce a higher standard s￿ the ￿rm must increase both the commission
and the salary. Likewise, when it becomes more di¢ cult to locate potential customers as
￿ increases, a strictly higher commission is needed to incentivize the agent to exert e⁄ort.
Unless the ￿rm also increases the salary and keeps the ratio b=w unchanged, this would
lead to a lower suitability standard. In addition, an increase in ￿ increases the ￿rm￿ s
marginal cost of further raising the standard, dw=ds￿ > 0. Finally, the ￿rm￿ s costs from
ensuring compliance to a given standard also depend on the e⁄ectiveness of monitoring,
 . As   increases, both the total costs, w, and the marginal cost of ensuring compliance
to a higher standard, dw=ds￿, decrease.29
4 Misselling in Market Equilibrium
This section analyzes the baseline version of the model in which the customer does not
observe the agent￿ s compensation scheme, set at stage 2.
The ￿rm chooses the suitability standard by trading o⁄the bene￿ts from a sale (net of
the expected ex post losses associated with misselling) with the agency costs of inducing
29This comparative statics result also holds with alternative speci￿cations of noisy monitoring technolo-
gies. For example, suppose the ￿rm reviews a fraction ￿ of all sales, which correctly identi￿es a type
with probability 1=2 < ’ < 1. (For example, the U.K. Financial Service Authority recommends as good
practice the case where a ￿rm commits to having a compliance o¢ cer check a ￿xed fraction of all sales.)
In this case, it turns out to be optimal to pay zero compensation not only if a check was performed and
indicated a sale to a type-l customer, but also if a check was not performed. The optimal base salary paid
when no sale is made is then
w =
￿[’q(s￿) + (1 ￿ ’)[1 ￿ q(s￿)]]
(2’ ￿ 1)
R 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
;
which, although independent of ￿, is now strictly decreasing in the informativeness ’. As also d2w=dsd’ <
0 holds, the comparative analysis in Proposition 2 survives with respect to ’.
12the agent to uphold the standard. Given that customers do not observe the ￿rm￿ s compen-
sation scheme, and thus the actual choice of the standard, their willingness to pay for the
product depends on the standard they anticipate will prevail. This tempts the ￿rm into
reducing the actual standard, thereby increasing the chance of a sale as well as reducing
the costs that arise from the internal agency problem.
To characterize the equilibrium, we proceed in three steps. First, we obtain the suit-
ability standard at which the seller is willing to sell, given the customer￿ s willingness to
pay. Second, we derive how the customer￿ s willingness to pay for the product depends on
the suitability standard the customer expects the seller to implement. Third, we charac-
terize the equilibrium, in which the customer correctly expects the standard that the seller
actually enforces through the choice of compensation scheme.
4.1 Firm￿ s Willingness to Sell
By setting the compensation for the agent at stage 2, the ￿rm indirectly chooses the
suitability standard at which it is willing to sell. The ￿rm￿ s conditional payo⁄ (gross of
compensation) if a sale is made at price p after the agent observes s is given by ￿(s) :=
p￿q(s)kh￿[1￿q(s)](kl+￿). This takes into account the possibly type-dependent costs of
serving the customer, k￿, as well as the expected penalty ￿ for selling to a type-l customer.
We denote the ￿rm￿ s expected gross pro￿ts by ￿G := ￿
R 1
s￿ ￿(s)f(s)ds and its net (of
wages) pro￿ts by ￿ := ￿G ￿ cS ￿ w.
Holding p ￿xed, for 0 < s￿ < 1 the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-order condition with respect to s￿,
d￿G=ds￿ = dw=ds￿, becomes more explicitly
￿f(s
￿)￿￿(s
￿) =
dw
ds￿. (6)
From Proposition 2 we know that the right-hand side of (6) is strictly positive, because
it is more costly for the ￿rm to ensure compliance to a higher standard s￿.30 At the
optimally implemented standard s￿, the ￿rm realizes a net loss on the marginal sale:
￿(s￿) < 0. However, implementing a standard that is below the ex post optimal level
reduces the costs incurred to incentivize the agent, and it is therefore optimal from an ex
ante perspective.
30For an explicit derivation of the derivative dw=ds￿ see the proof of Proposition 2.
13Abstracting for now from the corner solution with s￿ = 0, we assume that the ￿rm￿ s
program is strictly quasi-concave, so that the ￿rst-order condition is also su¢ cient and
pins down a unique interior solution, b s￿.31 Although this is a continuous function of all
parameters of the model, it sometimes will be useful to stress the dependence on the price
p by writing b s￿(p).
Recall that from Proposition 2 the marginal cost of raising the standard, dw=ds￿, is
strictly higher when sales incentives have to be heightened (because of an increase in ￿)
or when monitoring becomes less e⁄ective (because of a decrease in  ). Consequently, the
optimal standard is strictly lower if the agent￿ s sales incentives are higher or if monitoring
is less e⁄ective.32 Next, b s￿ is strictly lower as it becomes more pro￿table to expand sales
by lowering s￿, which is the case if either the price p increases or the penalty ￿ decreases.
Lemma 1 Holding all else constant, including a customer￿ s anticipated standard s￿, the
standard above which the ￿rm is willing to sell, b s￿, is continuous and monotonic with
db s￿=dp < 0, db s￿=d￿ > 0, db s￿=d￿ < 0, and db s￿=d  > 0.
4.2 Customer￿ s Willingness to Pay
Next, we turn to the advice game that takes place at stages 5￿ 7. Recall that the customer
is uninformed about the payo⁄ from purchasing the product, while the agent has a noisy
signal about it. When expecting the ￿rm to choose a compensation scheme that induces
a standard s￿, the customer is willing to pay the conditional expected utility
b p(s
￿) :=
Z 1
s￿
u(s)
f(s)
1 ￿ F(s￿)
ds; (7)
where u(s) := q(s)uh +[1￿q(s)](ul +￿￿). Recall that the fraction 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 of the ￿rm￿ s
expected penalty ￿ represents compensation to the customer if ul is realized.
Provided that p ￿ b p(s￿) holds, the customer is thus willing to follow the agent￿ s advice
and buy. In what follows, we restrict our attention to the informative equilibrium of this
cheap-talk game. As is well known, there also exists an uninformative equilibrium in which
31While b s￿ < 1 follows immediately, for high p a corner solution with b s￿ = 0 could arise. We return to
this issue in footnote 36.
32Having assumed strict quasiconcavity, with 0 < b s￿ < 1 this follows immediately from implicitly
di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition (6).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium and effect of transparency of commissions
the customer expects the agent to make the same recommendation regardless of the signal.
In this case, the advice stage would be super￿ uous.33
From (7), it follows immediately that when the seller is expected to enforce a more
stringent standard, the customer is willing to pay more for the product. This is also the
case if a larger compensatory transfer is made.
Lemma 2 The customer￿ s willingness to pay for the product, b p(s￿), is continuous and
monotonic with db p=ds￿ > 0, db p=d￿ > 0 for ￿ > 0, and db p=d￿ > 0 for ￿ > 0.
4.3 Equilibrium
At stage 1, it is optimal for the ￿rm to charge a price equal to the customer￿ s willingness
to pay b p(s￿), given in (7). A unique equilibrium thus is pinned down by the following
two requirements: that the ￿rm sets the maximum feasible price p = b p(s￿) under the
anticipated standard and that the anticipated standard s￿ is indeed subsequently optimal
for the ￿rm as s￿ = b s￿(p). This is illustrated in Figure 1 as the intersection of the customer￿ s
willingness-to-pay curve b p(s￿) and the ￿rm￿ s willingness-to-sell curve b s￿(p). We will also
return to this ￿gure later.
33Suppose instead that the customer expected the agent to always make the same recommendation,
regardless of the agent￿ s compensation and the product price set by the ￿rm. If in this case the customer￿ s
unconditional utility, b p(0) = quh + (1 ￿ q)ul, is not strictly positive, there will be no trade. Even if
b p(0) > 0 holds, however, there will only be trade if for p = b p(0) the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are non-negative as
b p(0) ￿ qkh ￿ (1 ￿ kl)(q + ￿) ￿ cS=￿. (We use here that w = 0.)
15Proposition 3 The standard s￿ implemented in equilibrium is increasing in the expected
penalty ￿, decreasing in the sales incentives ￿, increasing in the e⁄ectiveness of monitoring
 , and decreasing in the fraction ￿ of the expected penalty that represents compensation to
the customer.
A change in ￿ or   only shifts the ￿rm￿ s best-response function, b s￿, but does not a⁄ect
the customer￿ s willingness to pay, b p. The comparative analysis in Proposition 3 thus follows
intuitively from Lemma 1, where we still kept the price constant. Likewise, as a change
in ￿ directly a⁄ects only b p but not b s￿, the comparative statics result for the equilibrium
standard follows immediately from combining Lemmas 1 and 2: because compensation
accounts for a larger fraction of the ￿rm￿ s penalty, the ￿rm can charge a higher price
(Lemma 2), resulting in a lower standard (Lemma 1).
The comparative analysis in ￿ is slightly more involved because there are two con￿ icting
forces at work when ￿ > 0. In the simplest case when no compensation is paid to the
customer, ￿ = 0, an increase in ￿ only shifts b s￿ upwards leaving b p una⁄ected. It follows
immediately that the suitability standard increases. When a strictly positive fraction
￿ > 0 of the penalty represents compensation to the customer, there is an additional
indirect e⁄ect which works in the opposite direction: by increasing the maximum price
that the ￿rm can charge (Lemma 2), an increase in ￿ tempts the ￿rm to lower its standard
(Lemma 1). We ￿nd that this second e⁄ect is always smaller than the direct e⁄ect, so
that an increase in ￿ always increases the equilibrium standard s￿. This also holds, in
particular, if the entire penalty represents compensation to the customer (￿ = 1).
To see why this is the case, note ￿rst that the ￿rm￿ s choice of standard depends on
how often the ￿rm expects to pay the penalty at the marginal signal s = s￿, according
to the ￿rst-order condition in (6). In contrast, the customer￿ s willingness to pay in (7)
depends on the expected compensation across all signals s ￿ s￿. The ￿rst e⁄ect therefore
is stronger as the chance the penalty (and thus the compensation to the customer) must
be paid, 1 ￿ q(s), is strictly decreasing in s.34
Irrespective of what fraction of ￿ represents compensation to customers, a higher ex-
pected penalty has a disciplining role on the ￿rm. This suggests using ￿ as a policy
instrument to induce a particular suitability standard. We address this issue in the fol-
34Clearly, the discrepancy between the two e⁄ects becomes more pronounced as a smaller fraction ￿ of
￿ is rebated to type￿ l customers.
16lowing section. In turn, more e⁄ective monitoring (higher  ) allows the ￿rm to discipline
its own agent more e⁄ectively, thereby leading to a higher standard. In contrast, higher
prospecting costs result in a lower standard. These costs, ￿, may be higher for newly
introduced products or for new entrants to a market.35
Finally, note that the comparative statics in Proposition 3 assumed that an equilibrium
with s￿ > 0 exists. When such an equilibrium exists, it is indeed unique. Otherwise,
whether there is trade in equilibrium￿ albeit indiscriminately for all signals￿ depends on
the customer￿ s unconditional willingness to pay, b p(0) = quh +(1￿q)ul (cf. footnote 33).36
5 Agency and Policy
5.1 Role of Agency
Suppose that, in contrast to our present assumptions, the tasks of prospecting and advising
are carried out by an entrepreneurial (owner-managed) ￿rm. Absent the agency problem,
the ￿rm would advise the customer to purchase if and only if ￿(s￿) ￿ 0. As the optimal
choice of s￿ under the agency problem must satisfy the requirement that d￿G=ds￿ =
dw=ds￿, where dw=ds￿ > 0, it follows immediately that a strictly higher standard s￿ will
result without the agency problem. The introduction of the agency problem thus a⁄ects
the level of the equilibrium standard: because the agency problem increases the ￿rm￿ s
marginal cost from raising the standard s￿, the equilibrium standard is lower than what
results with an entrepreneurial ￿rm.
In addition, the standard s￿ becomes dependent on some parameters of the model
only in the presence of the agency problem. This dependence clearly holds for all factors
that determine the severity of the agency problem, as captured by the e⁄ectiveness   of
35Section 7 further discusses the role of product and industry characteristics. Section 9 develops an
extension of the basic model that allows us to rephrase the comparative analysis in ￿ in terms of the
competitiveness of the market.
36There is an additional technicality from which we abstracted when discussing Proposition 3. Recall
from the discussion of Proposition 1 (and, in particular, footnote 28) that for   < 1 the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts
are discontinuous at s￿ = 0 (with w dropping to zero). For   < 1 the ￿rm￿ s best response has thus
a discontinuity when extended to the corner s￿ = 0: there is a threshold p0 such that b s￿(p) > 0 for
p < p0 and b s￿(p) = 0 for p > p0. In this case, an equilibrium with trade may have the ￿rm randomizing
between implementing s￿ = 0 and s￿ = b s￿(p0). If instead   = 1 holds, for trade to arise in equilibrium,
as presumed in Proposition 3, the following conditions are su¢ cient: First, with ￿f(0)￿￿(0) > ￿q0(0)=q,
where p = b p(0) and q0(0) = dq(s￿)=ds￿js￿=0, the ￿rm would want to deviate to some s￿ > 0 if the customer
expected it to choose s￿ = 0. Second, at the resulting (￿xed point) value s￿ the ￿rm earns non-negative
pro￿ts, for which it is in turn su¢ cient that b p(0) ￿ qkh ￿ (1 ￿ q)(kl + ￿) ￿ cS=￿.
17the ￿rm￿ s monitoring technology. In addition, through the interdependence of the agent￿ s
tasks, s￿ becomes dependent on the sales incentives the ￿rm must o⁄er the agent. In
contrast, if the entrepreneur could sell directly without hiring an agent, then the equilib-
rium standard would not depend on either the costs of sales e⁄ort, cS, or the likelihood
with which e⁄ort results in a new customer contact, ￿. While these costs are already
sunk for the entrepreneur when advising the customer, the agent must still earn the sales
commission b and, therefore, has a bias towards advising customers to purchase. This bias
increases as the agent must be given higher incentives, following an increase in ￿.
5.2 Scope for Policy
We previously noted that the expected penalty ￿ can be interpreted as a public policy
parameter. However, ￿rms may have incentives to discipline themselves, e.g., through the
creation of a self-regulatory organization. This is most obvious in the case where otherwise
￿ = 0. If in addition the customer￿ s unconditional expected utility without advice was
negative as quh +(1￿q)ul < 0, and if the ￿rm had the same cost k￿ = k of serving either
type of customer, then the market would break down. (More precisely, in this case no
standard s￿ > 0 for which b p(s￿) > k can be sustained as an equilibrium when ￿ = 0.)
To analyze the minimum scope for policy intervention, we assume that the ￿rm has the
same means as a policymaker to impose a penalty ￿ > 0 on itself in case ul is realized.37
Recall that the fraction 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 of ￿ represents a compensatory transfer to the customer,
while the residual fraction 1￿￿ represents the deadweight loss from enforcing the penalty.38
Next de￿ne the ￿rm￿ s expected cost of serving a given customer by k(s) = qkh +(1￿q)kl.
From ul < 0, it must hold that uh￿kh > ul￿kl; otherwise, any trade would be ine¢ cient.
Consequently, trade increases social welfare if and only if the observed s is su¢ ciently
high. A social planner thus chooses ￿ so as to maximize welfare
￿
Z 1
s￿
[u(s) ￿ k(s) ￿ [1 ￿ q(s)](1 ￿ ￿)￿]f (s)ds ￿ cS; (8)
37Realistically, self-regulatory organizations might have less power and fewer means to enforce standards
and discipline members than regulators. In addition, one could think about the issuance of warranties or,
in the case of long-term contracts, about granting customers the right to early cancellation.
38If also ￿ was a choice variable, then setting ￿ = 1 would be optimal for both the ￿rm and a social
planner. Note that with ￿ = 1 the ￿rm essentially achieves (third-degree) price discrimination between
type-h and type-l customers, where the former pay the price of p and the latter only the expected price
of p ￿ ￿.
18subject to the constraint that the standard s￿ resulting for any given ￿ arises as the
equilibrium of the ensuing market game. Note that when ￿ = 1 welfare is clearly highest
if the penalty is chosen such that u(s￿) = k(s￿): the customer￿ s expected utility at s￿ is
equal to the ￿rm￿ s expected cost of serving this customer.39 If there is some deadweight
loss from enforcing a penalty (￿ < 1), then u(s￿) < k(s￿) holds at the social planner￿ s
optimal choice of ￿.
In what follows, it is again convenient to presume that the program of a social planner
and that of a self-regulating ￿rm are strictly quasi-concave. Also, to be concise we focus
on the case where the suitability standard that is implemented by the respective optimal
choice of ￿ is always interior with s￿ > 0.40 Note that this implies, in particular, that
kl + ￿ > kh. Otherwise, as already noted earlier, ￿rm and customer interests would
be orthogonal, implying that the customer would never follow the ￿rm￿ s (or its agent￿ s)
advice.41
As the ￿rm extracts all expected customer surplus (conditional on s￿) in (7), total
surplus (8) is equal to the expected pro￿ts obtained by an entrepreneurial ￿rm, ￿G ￿ cS.
Consequently, the optimal choice of ￿ by a social planner coincides with the choice of an
entrepreneurial ￿rm through the use of a self-regulatory organization.
However, this conclusion no longer holds for a ￿rm selling through an agent. A ￿rm
subject to the agency problem would choose a strictly lower value of ￿, and accordingly
s￿, than a social planner, because the agent￿ s rent merely represents a transfer from the
perspective of a social planner. This can be seen most directly when there is no deadweight
loss, ￿ = 1. In the absence of policy intervention, the ￿rm through self-regulation would
choose a level of ￿ that leads to a standard s￿ satisfying
￿￿f(s
￿)[u(s
￿) ￿ k(s
￿)] =
dw
ds￿ > 0
and thus u(s￿) < k(s￿). In conclusion, the self-regulatory standard for a ￿rm subject to
the agency problem is strictly lower than the one resulting with a self-regulating entrepre-
neurial ￿rm as well as with policy intervention.
39Note that from u(0) = ul < 0 and from u(1) = uh > kh the e¢ cient threshold s￿ is thus always
interior.
40A su¢ cient condition for this is that ￿ is not too small.
41For kl < kh this requires that the optimal ￿ that implements s￿ > 0 must be bounded away from zero.
19Proposition 4 Suppose that through self-regulation a ￿rm could avail itself of the same
technology for choosing the level of the expected penalty ￿ as a social planner. Then an
entrepreneurial ￿rm would choose the same ￿, and thus the same standard s￿, as a social
planner, while a ￿rm employing an agent would choose a strictly lower ￿, and thus also a
strictly lower s￿, than a social planner.
Finally, note that in order to maintain a given standard, a policymaker must increase
￿ when the ￿rm provides its agents with higher sales incentives (higher ￿) or when the
e⁄ectiveness of the ￿rm￿ s internal monitoring decreases (lower  ).42
6 Transparency of Commissions
In the preceding analysis, the standard s￿ = b s￿(p) and the prevailing price p = b p(s￿)
were jointly determined in equilibrium, given that the agent￿ s compensation and thus the
prevailing standard s￿ were not observable to customers. Suppose instead that the ￿rm
can credibly disclose the compensation scheme (w;b). Because the compensation uniquely
pins down a corresponding standard s￿ from (1), the ￿rm is able to choose any s￿ along
with the optimal price b p(s￿). The prevailing equilibrium standard s￿ is characterized by
the ￿rst-order condition
￿
db p(s￿)
ds￿ [1 ￿ F(s
￿)] ￿ f(s
￿)￿￿(s
￿) =
dw
ds￿: (9)
Comparing this with the ￿rst-order condition under no transparency, (6), the ￿rst term
in (9) is new and captures the positive impact of a now observable increase in s￿ on the
maximum feasible price. From this observation (together with strict quasi-concavity of
the objective function) we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 If the ￿rm￿ s compensation scheme can credibly be made transparent, a
higher standard s￿ results for any given ￿.
In Figure 1, the equilibrium with transparency is obtained at the tangency of the ￿rm￿ s
isopro￿t curve, ￿T, with the customer￿ s willingness-to-pay curve, b p(s￿). Pro￿ts are strictly
42Cf. Proposition 3. Holding the targeted standard ￿xed is indeed optimal if ￿ = 1. For ￿ < 1 it
must also be taken into account that the social costs from implementing a given standard increase in
￿ and decrease in  . Whether a social planner would want to increase ￿ then depends on whether the
additional deadweight loss is outweighed by the additional ine¢ ciency that would result from a lower
standard (holding ￿ ￿xed).
20higher than those realized without transparency, ￿N. Given the resulting higher price p
with transparency, however, if the ￿rm￿ s commitment is not credible, then it would want
to deviate to a lower standard b s￿(p), realizing still higher (o⁄-equilibrium) pro￿ts ￿D.43
Under transparency, the fully observable compensation contract o⁄ered to the agent
therefore provides the ￿rm with a commitment device that is absent for entrepreneurial
￿rms. Even though a ￿rm would strictly prefer to voluntarily make its compensation
transparent, in practice this may not be credible. Individual customers may lack incentives
or legal means of monitoring the ￿rm￿ s remuneration policy. Furthermore, the ￿rm may
￿nd ways to provide the agent with less observable (implicit) incentives to sell. Policy
intervention could, instead, provide more credibility to disclosure.44
7 Organization of Sales Process
Direct marketing may be necessary to make customers aware of the existence of a new
product or of a ￿rm￿ s entry into a market. Incumbents that sell more established products
may not have to employ an agent who performs both tasks of prospecting and advising
customers, though. For instance, a brick-and-mortar bank could inform its clientele about
the availability of new savings or loan products during regular branch visits. This section
explores how the organization of the sales process a⁄ects the prevailing suitability standard.
To this end, we generalize our analysis and assume that the task of advising is also
costly: the agent can observe the pre-sale signal s at private disutility cA ￿ 0. As this may
typically involve spending time with the customer so as to establish whether the respective
product is a good match, we suppose that the customer (but not the ￿rm) can observe
whether the agent exerts e⁄ort at this stage. Recall that in equilibrium the ￿rm sets the
price equal to the customer￿ s willingness to pay, b p(s￿). For s￿ > 0 this strictly exceeds the
customer￿ s unconditional willingness to pay, b p(0) = quh + (1 ￿ q)ul. Consequently, if the
agent shirks at the advice stage, then the customer will not purchase and the agent will
earn only the base salary, w. For an agent who is incentivized to prospect for a customer,
it must subsequently be optimal to exert e⁄ort at the advice stage. However, because the
43Note that as b s￿(p) maximizes pro￿ts for given p, iso-pro￿t curves have zero slope at the point where
they intersect with b s￿(p).
44Under the ￿Markets in Financial Instruments Directive￿ (MiFID) since January 2008 commissions
for the sale of retail ￿nancial products must be disclosed in the European Union. In the U.K., such a
requirement has been mandated by the Financial Service Authority for several years.
21agent has to be compensated for the associated costs of information acquisition, cA, this
requires a higher commission. To prevent a reduction in standard, the higher commission
must be matched by a higher base salary.
Taking the agent￿ s additional costs cA into account, the agent complies with some
standard s￿ if the base wage equals
w =
(cS=￿ + cA)[1 ￿   [1 ￿ q(s￿)]]
 
R 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
; (10)
analogously to the derivation in Proposition 1. This implies that the marginal cost of
raising the standard, dw=ds￿, is higher if cA > 0. Applying the results from Proposition
3, we have the following:
Proposition 6 If the agent has to incur an additional private cost cA to observe the signal
s, then the ￿rm must pay a higher sales commission and a higher base salary to ensure
compliance with a given standard.
Suppose instead that the agent only provides advice, but does not control the cus-
tomer￿ s arrival (with probability ￿). The agent￿ s cost for making a sale is equal to the cost
of information acquisition, cA. Completely analogous to our previous results, the required
salary is
w =
cA [1 ￿   [1 ￿ q(s￿)]]
 
R 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
: (11)
Comparing with (10), we have the following:
Proposition 7 Compared to the baseline case in which the same agent who prospects for
customers also advises them, a strictly higher equilibrium standard s￿ results when one
agent is responsible only for prospecting and a second agent is separately in charge of
advising.
This result provides a causal link between the organization of the sales process in an
industry or ￿rm and the prevailing suitability standard.45 If ￿rms in an industry di⁄er in
how they organize their sales process, then Proposition 7 suggests that a uniform policy
may be too harsh on some but too lenient on other ￿rms.
45While there are clearly circumstances in which task separation is not feasible, some ￿rms may have
the choice between allocating tasks separately or to a single agent (and, thereby, possibly also enjoying
additional cost synergies ￿ > 0). For example, door-to-door direct marketing techniques may be more
cost e⁄ective for selling new products. Absent any necessity to bundle tasks or strong cost synergies from
doing so, it is straightforward to show that task separation would be optimal.
228 Contract Resale
For the purpose of this section, it is helpful to focus on the case of ￿nancial products,
particularly loan contracts. Banks and other intermediaries that originate loans, in par-
ticular mortgages to households, often resell them to free up capital and diversify risk.
We presume that this does not shield the originating ￿rm from the penalty ￿.46 However,
when kl 6= kh, reselling a contract at price P still a⁄ects the ￿rm￿ s relative pro￿ts from
selling to di⁄erent types of customers. If a loan is not resold, then the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts (gross
of the penalty) are given by p ￿ k￿, while the ￿rm realizes P if the contract is resold.
We now stipulate that kl > kh, which for given prices makes type-l customers less
attractive to the ￿rm, provided it does not resell contracts.47 Now denote by b ￿(s) :=
P ￿ [1 ￿ q(s)]￿ the ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts when reselling a contract. We suppose that P
is set along with p at the start of the game, i.e., before the ￿rm implements s￿ through
the choice of its compensation scheme. The resale price is optimally chosen as high as
possible given the anticipated standard s￿, now extracting all surplus from the buyers of
the contracts:
b P(s
￿) :=
Z 1
s￿
[p ￿ k(s)]
f(s)
1 ￿ F(s￿)
ds: (12)
We consider a ￿rm that keeps a fraction ￿ of its contracts, and sells the remaining fraction
1 ￿ ￿.48
Proposition 8 If kl > kh holds strictly, then the equilibrium standard decreases as the
￿rm resells a larger fraction of its contracts. In this case, the agent￿ s compensation is
made steeper (higher b=w ratio).
In the U.S. mortgage market, banks and ￿nancial ￿rms are the two main types of
mortgage originators. According to Bernadette Minton, Anthony B. Sanders, and Philip
46Following the recent increase of defaults in subprime loans and the associated claims of misselling,
some U.S. politicians recently have proposed a system of ￿assignee liability￿to extend legal and ￿nancial
liability to investment banks that repackage mortgages into bonds and sell them (see ￿ Democrats hit out
at Wall St. over subprime loans,￿Financial Times, April 12, 2007). In the context of our model, it is easy
to show that a strictly lower standard results when the originating ￿rm only bears a fraction ￿ of ￿ while
the residual fraction 1 ￿ ￿ is ￿assigned￿to the ultimate counterparty of the customer, i.e., the buyers of
the (loan) contracts. On the other hand, a strictly higher standard arises if an additional penalty b ￿ > 0
is imposed.
47Applied to household loans, type-l customers may have more risky future income. They may also
bene￿t less from a loan in the presence of substantial personal bankruptcy costs. In this case, the role
of advice could be justi￿ed by the complexity of products but also by the low sophistication of some
households, who may be far less able to predict their likelihood of default than the ￿rm and its agents.
48Note that as the ￿rm does not observe s, it cannot opportunistically resell only contracts with low s.
23E. Strahan (2004), banks are more likely to retain the loans they originate, while ￿nancial
￿rms are more likely to sell their loans on the secondary market. Consistent with this,
casual evidence suggests that bank loan o¢ cers are more likely to earn a ￿xed salary while
loan o¢ cers in ￿nancial ￿rms earn substantial commissions. Proposition 8 also suggests
that banks would apply a higher standard s￿.49
In terms of public policy, the heterogeneity of ￿rms￿proclivity to resell contracts,
like the heterogeneity in internal sales processes, creates a problem: a uniformly targeted
standard cannot be obtained by implementing a uniform policy, as represented by ￿.
9 Elastic Demand and Competition
Thus far the equilibrium price has been determined by the customer￿ s expected net utility
given the prevailing standard s￿. This section generalizes the model by considering a
non-trivial pricing problem with elastic demand. Now suppose that for given price p and
expected standard s￿ the likelihood with which an interested customer arrives is given
more generally by a strictly decreasing function ￿(z￿), where z￿ = p ￿ E[u j s ￿ s￿] with
E[u j s ￿ s￿] :=
R 1
s￿ u(s)
f(s)
1￿F(s￿)ds. Hence, ￿(z￿) represents the ￿rm￿ s residual demand
function, expressed by the probability of a given customer being willing to purchase when
advised to do so.
Consider ￿rst an entrepreneurial ￿rm, with gross pro￿ts ￿G = ￿(z￿)
R 1
s￿ ￿(s)f(s)ds.
Focusing on an interior optimum, pro￿ts are maximized by a price p satisfying the ￿rst-
order condition
￿Z 1
s￿
￿(s)
f(s)
1 ￿ F(s￿)
ds
￿￿
1 ￿
dE[u j s ￿ s￿]
ds￿
ds￿
dp
￿
= ￿
￿(z￿)
￿0(z￿)
: (13)
Recall also that the entrepreneurial ￿rm advises the customer to purchase if and only if
￿(s) ￿ 0, by setting ￿(s￿) = 0. If we had ds￿=dp = 0, we would be back to a standard
pricing problem with the ￿rm￿ s (expected) margin from a sale being on the left-hand side
of (13).50 In our model of advice, however, an increase in p also shifts the standard s￿
downwards, because ds￿=dp = ￿1=￿0(s￿) < 0. As this reduction in standard is rationally
expected by the customer, a further reduction in demand is induced because the customer￿ s
expected utility from a purchase, E[u j s ￿ s￿], is strictly increasing in s￿.
49On a possible link between the suitability standard and the sale of loans in the case of subprime
mortgages, see the recent evidence in Atif R. Mian and Amir Su￿ (2008).
50Dividing the right-hand side by p, we would obtain the elasticity of the ￿rm￿ s residual demand.
24What is the e⁄ect of a change in the ￿rm￿ s competitive environment? For given price
p, an increase in competition should lead ￿rst and foremost to a reduction in the ￿rm￿ s
residual demand, ￿(z￿). For an entrepreneurial ￿rm, this does not directly a⁄ect the
prevailing standard s￿ because ￿(s￿) = 0 is independent of demand. However, a change
in residual demand a⁄ects s￿ indirectly, through a possible change in price p. If the
￿rm responds to the increase in competitive pressure by lowering p, a sale becomes less
attractive, leading to an increase in s￿.
This observation for the entrepreneurial ￿rm mirrors a ￿nding by Bolton, Freixas, and
Shapiro (2007). In their model, only one of two ￿rms provides a product that o⁄ers the best
match for a given, uninformed customer. Under competition, the ￿rm whose product is ex
ante less likely to provide the best ￿t chooses a low price to commit to giving appropriate
advice.51 Thus, competition would be associated with lower prices and reduced incentives
to missell. In contrast, a ￿rm selling through an agent may lower its suitability standard
as competitive pressure increases, as we show below.
In the presence of the agency problem, a reduction in residual demand has a direct
e⁄ect on the prevailing standard. To see this most clearly, we proceed by holding the
price p ￿xed. There are now two reasons why a reduction in ￿(z￿) pushes down the
optimal standard with the agency problem. To make transparent the two e⁄ects by which
a reduction in ￿(z￿) a⁄ects s￿, restate the ￿rst-order condition (6) as follows:
￿￿(z
￿)f(s
￿)￿(s
￿) =
dw
ds￿: (14)
The ￿rst e⁄ect works through an increase in the marginal costs of raising the standard,
dw=ds￿. From Proposition 1 we have with ￿ = cS=￿ that
dw2
ds￿d￿
= ￿
1
￿
dw
ds￿ < 0:
The second e⁄ect works through the ￿rst term in the derivative (14). Recall here that
￿(s￿) < 0 holds at the optimal choice s￿ = b s￿, implying that a sale at s = s￿ is ex
post unpro￿table for the ￿rm. (Intuitively, this was optimal because from dw=ds￿ > 0 a
reduction in the standard allows the ￿rm to reduce the ex ante agency costs.) A reduction
51As in our setting, the ￿rm trades o⁄ pro￿ts from selling with post-sale costs incurred if the customer
was ill served by the purchase. Unlike us, they posit that the customer always has a positive willingness
to pay for either of the two ￿rms￿products, while ￿rms observe perfectly which product provides the best
￿t.
25in ￿(z￿) now makes a sale less likely from an ex ante perspective. Consequently, the ￿rm￿ s
objective function puts less weight on the ex post loss ￿(s￿) < 0 relative to the ex ante
bene￿ts in terms of lower agency costs. Formally, this is expressed by the factor ￿(z￿) in
the ￿rst term of the derivative (14).
In equilibrium, for a given p the customer again must have rational expectations about
the prevailing standard. Recall that customer expectations a⁄ect residual demand through
the ￿net price￿z￿ = p ￿ E[u j s ￿ s￿]. Since the net price z￿ is now strictly decreasing in
s￿ and the optimal standard is also strictly decreasing in z￿, there may now be multiple
equilibria, in stark contrast to the cases analyzed thus far.52 Intuitively, if customers
expect the ￿rm to apply a higher standard, then they become more willing to purchase.
As this in turn lowers z￿, and thereby pushes up the probability of a sale, it indeed becomes
optimal for the ￿rm to implement a higher standard through the choice of its compensation
scheme. If, instead, customers anticipate a lower standard, then the higher cuto⁄ z￿ and
the corresponding lower probability of a sale make it optimal for the ￿rm to set the lower
standard.
To formalize the preceding discussion, we now stipulate for concreteness a functional
form for the level change in residual demand ￿(z￿) = b ￿(￿ + z￿), where an increase in the
demand shifter ￿ represents a reduction in demand everywhere.53
Proposition 9 Holding the price p constant, if there is a unique equilibrium, then the
equilibrium standard s￿ strictly decreases in the level of the ￿rm￿ s residual demand, as
captured by an increase of ￿ in b ￿(￿ + z￿).
If the ￿rm optimally reacts to a decrease in demand by reducing its price, with agency
there are two countervailing e⁄ects on the suitability standard. The overall e⁄ect intuitively
depends on speci￿c circumstances in the following way. If competition intensi￿es among the
same players, the price e⁄ect may be more important, with ￿rms ending up with market
52For an entrepreneurial ￿rm with elastic demand, in contrast, uniqueness for a given p is trivially
guaranteed because s￿ does not depend on z￿.
53Proposition 9 would hold also if we stipulated instead that ￿(z￿) = ￿b ￿(z￿) or that ￿(z￿) = b ￿(z￿)￿￿.
The speci￿cation ￿(z￿) = b ￿(￿+z￿) allows for the following natural interpretation. A given customer￿ s net
utility could depend, ￿rst, on a random component z 2 [z;z] with cumulative distribution G(z), capturing
horizontal di⁄erentiation, and, second, on the value of the next best alternative, which could be captured
by ￿: z￿ := p+￿￿E[u j s ￿ s￿]. Note that if ul￿￿+z < 0 holds, then a sale to a type-l customer would
still be always ine¢ cient. Finally, note that if z is uniformly distributed, it is straightforward to show
that the entrepreneurial ￿rm￿ s program for p is strictly quasi-concave, while from implicit di⁄erentiation
of (13) an increase in ￿ leads to a strictly higher optimal price p.
26shares similar to their initial level. If, instead, entry of new competitors signi￿cantly
reduces a ￿rm￿ s share of the market, then the e⁄ect of Proposition 9 should be more
pronounced. For instance, if entrants were to target a particular customer segment, which
the ￿rm could only retain by a substantial reduction in price, then the ￿rm￿ s best response
actually may be to sustain its price while accepting a lower market share. This would then
lead to a reduction in the standard s￿.
10 Conclusion
A ￿rm that sells through agents must ensure that they comply with its internal standards
when advising customers. When the sales force requires steeper incentives (for example, as
competition for customers intensi￿es), ensuring compliance with a given standard becomes
more costly for the ￿rm. Faced with a higher marginal cost of compliance, the ￿rm
gradually becomes more permissive towards potential misselling.
Introduction of the internal agency problem has two key implications. First, it a⁄ects
the level of the suitability standard prevailing in equilibrium. Second, it is only through
the agency problem that standards are a⁄ected by several additional factors, such as the
di¢ culty in attracting customers, the transparency of the commission structure, and the
organization of the sales process. When addressing misselling problems, policymakers
must take into account these organizational variables, unless the industry is exclusively
composed of entrepreneurial professionals.
The consideration of ￿rms￿agency problems also points to a potential pitfall for pol-
icymakers. To the extent that ￿rms vary in their respective characteristics (such as the
organization of their sales process), di⁄erent policy standards would be required for dif-
ferent ￿rms within the same industry, which may not always be feasible to implement.
Future work could adapt our framework to the circumstances of particular industries.
Such analysis could shed light on cross-country di⁄erences in regulation and industry
organization. While the prevailing policy may a⁄ect ￿rms￿contractual and organizational
choices, the prevailing organization of the industry (including the degree of competition,
the level of vertical integration, or the use of independent intermediaries) in turn should
in￿ uence the optimal policy response.
27Appendix A: Con￿ icting Tasks in Direct Marketing Agency
This appendix analyzes incentive provision for a direct marketing agent in the context
of a toy version of our model. In this streamlined model, we assume that the agent perfectly
observes the customer￿ s type and is granted full control over the purchase decision.54 To
illustrate the con￿ ict between the agent￿ s two tasks in the simplest way, we further suppose
that the ￿rm wants to induce the agent to exert prospecting e⁄ort and to sell only to the
type-h customer.
Because the agent is protected by limited liability and the outside option for the agent
is set to zero, it is optimal for the ￿rm to pay no wage, w0 = 0, when the post-sale signal
indicates a type-l customer. That leaves two compensation levels to be determined for the
two remaining veri￿able states: a wage of w2 if no such negative information is received
following a sale, and a wage of w1 if no sale is made. Because the agent￿ s expected payo⁄
from a sale to a type-l customer is (1 ￿  )w2, the condition
w1 ￿ (1 ￿  )w2 (15)
ensures that the agent does not sell to a type-l customer.55 To guarantee that the agent
does not sell indiscriminately to all customers, the wage w1 must be large enough to com-
pensate the agent for the payo⁄foregone when not recommending a purchase. Intuitively,
condition (15) is easier to satisfy if a deviation (i.e., misselling to a type-l customer) is
detected with a higher probability  .
In addition, the compensation scheme must incentivize the agent to incur search cost
cS to contact a customer in the ￿rst place. Recall here that sale follows search e⁄ort only
with probability ￿q, given that a potential customer is located with probability ￿ and that
the fraction of type-h customers is q. Because the agent receives w1 when not concluding
a sale, the agent will only exert e⁄ort if
￿q(w2 ￿ w1) ￿ cS: (16)
That is, the commission w2￿w1 the agent realizes when making a sale to a type￿ h customer
must be su¢ ciently large. Condition (16) is easier to satisfy if it is more likely overall that
a sale is made after incurring cost cS.
54While we assume here that the customer delegates the purchase decision to the agent, in equilibrium
of our baseline model it is optimal for the customer to follow the agent￿ s non-binding advice.
55As is immediately apparent, the agent under the optimal contract will strictly prefer to sell to type-h
customers.
28The ￿rm￿ s objective is to minimize expected wage costs ￿qw2 + (1 ￿ ￿q)w1 subject to
the constraints (15) and (16). We now verify that both constraints (15) and (16) must bind
for the expected wage bill to be minimized. If neither of these two constraints was binding,
then the ￿rm could deviate pro￿tably by marginally reducing either of the two wages w1
or w2. Suppose now that (15) was not binding, in which case we already know that (16)
must bind. After substitution, the ￿rm￿ s expected wage costs then become cS + w1. As
long as (15) was not binding, the ￿rm could then pro￿tably deviate by further reducing w1.
Having thus established that (15) must always bind, we now can substitute this constraint
to obtain the expected wage costs w2[1 ￿   +  ￿q]. Unless (16) also binds, the ￿rm thus
could pro￿tably deviate by further reducing w2. From the two binding constraints (15)
and (16), we ￿nd the rent the agent obtains, even when not exerting sales e⁄ort. This
rent,
w1 = cS
￿
1 ￿  
 
1
￿q
￿
;
originates from the ￿rm￿ s inability to distinguish whether a lack of a sale should be at-
tributed to the agent￿ s failure to prospect for a customer or to the presence of an unsuitable
customer.56
The agent￿ s rent￿ borne by the ￿rm to prevent (mis)selling to a type-l customer￿ is
strictly increasing in the agent￿ s cost of sales e⁄ort, cS. This comparative statics result is
driven by the interdependence between the agent￿ s two tasks. To understand this, denote
the agent￿ s base salary (paid when no sale is made) by w := w1 and the sales commission
(paid, in addition to the base salary, following a sale that is not subsequently contested)
by b := w2 ￿ w1. Rewriting the binding constraint (16) for eliciting sales e⁄ort from the
agent as
b =
1
q
cS
￿
;
we see that a higher commission is necessary after an increase in cS or a decrease in q￿. In
either case, generating a suitable sales opportunity is more costly for the agent, implying
that incentives must increase. But the greater the incentives to sell, the more the agent is
tempted to subsequently missell to a type-l customer. Transforming the binding constraint
56In contrast, if it was veri￿able whether the agent contacted a customer, then the ￿rm could directly
compensate the agent for the associated e⁄ort cost cS, thereby ensuring that the agent would not be
biased towards recommending purchase. Also, paying the agent a rent would no longer be necessary if the
customer type was veri￿able (without noise). In that case, the ￿rm could simply specify wl = 0 for a sale
to a type-l customer and wh = cS=(q￿) for a sale to a type-h customer.
29(15) for eliciting only suitable sales into the requirement
w = b
￿
1 ￿  
 
￿
;
we see that, when the sales commission b is higher, the ￿rm must increase the base salary w
to rebalance the incentives for the agent not to sell at all. Hence, when the task of locating
potential customers and generating interest in the product becomes more di¢ cult, the ￿rm
must increase not only the commission but also the salary to ensure that the agent sells
only to suitable customers. Intuitively, the extent to which the ￿rm must pay the agent a
rent through the base salary is also determined by  , the e⁄ectiveness of the ￿rm￿ s ability
to monitor the agent.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: For this proof, we introduce the following notation for the
payments made to the agent: w1 if no sale was made, w2 if a sale was made and no
negative information was obtained, and w0 if a sale to a type-l customer was detected. It
remains to be shown that it is optimal for the ￿rm to set w0 = 0. In general, the agent￿ s
expected compensation from a sale is given by V (s) = w0 + [1 ￿ [1 ￿ q(s)] ](w2 ￿ w0).
By optimality, incentive constraint (2) binds, from which it follows that the agent extracts
rent w1 = V (s￿), given standard s￿. The ￿rm￿ s objective is thus to choose (w0;w1;w2) so
as to minimize V (s￿) while still satisfying (2). After substitution from the de￿nition of
V (s) and (2), we obtain
w = V (s
￿) = w0 +
cS
￿
1 ￿  [1 ￿ q(s￿)]
R 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
;
from which w0 = 0 is indeed optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2: Di⁄erentiating (4), we obtain dw=d￿ = w=￿ > 0 along with
dw
d 
= ￿
1
 
2 R 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
< 0;
dw
ds￿ =
￿
R 1
s￿ [1 ￿   [1 ￿ q(s)]]f(s)ds
 
hR 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
i2
dq(s￿)
ds￿ > 0:
30Further di⁄erentiation yields
d2w
ds￿d￿
=
R 1
s￿ [1 ￿   [1 ￿ q(s)]]f(s)ds
 
hR 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
i2
dq(s￿)
ds￿ > 0;
d2w
ds￿d 
= ￿
￿[1 ￿ F(s￿)]
 
2
hR 1
s￿ [q(s) ￿ q(s￿)]f(s)ds
i2
dq(s￿)
ds￿ < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3: Using the fact that b s￿ is strictly decreasing in p and that b p
is strictly increasing in s￿, when the system s￿ = b s￿(p) and p = b p(s￿) has a (￿xed point)
solution s￿ > 0, this solution must be unique. For comparative statics, it is now convenient
to rewrite the equilibrium conditions as
&1 : = p ￿
Z 1
s￿
u(s)
f(s)
1 ￿ F(s￿)
ds = 0;
&2 : = ￿f(s
￿)￿￿(s
￿) ￿
dw
ds￿ = 0:
The determinant of the Jacobian, D = (@&1=@s￿)(@&2=@p)￿(@&2=@s￿)(@&1=@p), is strictly
positive from @&1=@s￿ < 0, @&1=@p > 0, @&2=@s￿ < 0, and @&2=@p < 0. From Cramer￿ s rule,
ds￿=d￿ > 0 holds if (@&1=@￿)(@&2=@p) < (@&2=@￿)(@&1=@p). This condition is equivalent
to
￿ <
1 ￿ q(s￿)
R 1
s￿ [1 ￿ q(s)]
f(s)
1￿F(s￿)ds
;
which is satis￿ed because s￿ < 1. The comparative statics in ￿,  , and ￿ are more
immediate as each of these variables a⁄ect only one of the two conditions &1 and &2.
Precisely, we have
ds￿
d￿
= ￿
1
D
￿
d2w
ds￿d￿
@&1
@p
￿
< 0;
ds￿
d 
= ￿
1
D
￿
d2w
ds￿d 
@&1
@p
￿
> 0;
ds￿
d￿
= ￿
1
D
￿￿
￿￿
Z 1
s￿
[1 ￿ q(s)]
f(s)
1 ￿ F(s￿)
ds
￿
@&2
@p
￿
< 0;
where we use d2w=ds￿d￿ > 0 and d2w=ds￿d  < 0 from Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4: Restricting attention to cases in which the implemented
choices of s￿ are interior, it remains to show that a ￿rm selling through an agent chooses
a strictly smaller level of ￿ and, from Proposition 3, a strictly lower level of s￿ than
31the social planner. Recall that the objective function, ￿G ￿ cS ￿ w, is assumed to be
strictly quasiconcave in the choice variable ￿. The assertion then follows immediately
from dw=d￿ = (dw=ds￿)(ds￿=d￿) > 0, where dw=ds￿ > 0 by Proposition 2 and ds￿=d￿ > 0
by Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 8: To solve for an equilibrium, it is convenient to de￿ne a value
! := ￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)P and a function b !(s￿) := ￿b p(s￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)b P(s￿), where
b !(s
￿) = b p(s
￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
s￿
[q(s)kh + [1 ￿ q(s)]kl]
f(s)
1 ￿ F(s￿)
ds: (17)
Note that b !(s￿) is strictly increasing in s￿ as b p(s￿) increases in s￿and kh < kl. Gross pro￿ts
are now ￿G = ￿
R 1
s￿ [￿￿(s) + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿(s)]f(s)ds, with ￿rst-order condition
d￿G
ds￿ = ￿f(s
￿)￿[￿￿(s
￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿(s
￿)] =
dw
ds￿:
With a slight abuse of notation, we now denote the optimal standard as a function b s￿(!),
which is strictly decreasing. Equilibrium is given by the requirements s￿ = b s￿(!) and
! = b !(s￿). If an interior equilibrium with s￿ > 0 exists, then uniqueness again follows
from strict monotonicity: b !(s￿) is strictly increasing and b s￿(!) is strictly decreasing. Note
that the partial derivatives satisfy b !s￿ > 0, b s￿
! < 0, b s￿
￿ > 0, and b !￿ > 0.
For comparative statics of s￿ in ￿, it is now convenient to consider the system of
equations s￿ = b s￿(!) and ! = b !(s￿). With the determinant of the Jacobian D = 1 ￿
b s￿
!b !s￿ > 0, we have that ds￿=d￿ = ￿D￿=D > 0, where D￿ = ￿b !￿ ￿ b s￿
￿b !s￿ < 0. Finally,
comparative statics in the compensation scheme follows immediately from ds￿=d￿ > 0 and
the characterization of b=w in (1).
Proof of Proposition 9: Analogously to the proof of Proposition 3, we characterize the
equilibrium for a given price p as a solution to the following two equations in z￿ and s￿:
￿1 : = z
￿ ￿ [￿ + p ￿ E[u j s ￿ s
￿]] = 0;
￿2 : = ￿f(s
￿)￿(z
￿)￿(s
￿) ￿
dw
ds￿ = 0:
Note also that
@￿2
@z￿ = ￿￿
0(z
￿)f(s
￿)￿(s
￿) ￿
d2w
ds￿dz￿ < 0
follows from
d2w
ds￿dz￿ = ￿
￿0(z￿)
￿(z￿)
dw
ds￿ > 0
32and ￿(s￿) < 0. Uniqueness is ensured, as stipulated in the main text, because the de-
terminant of the Jacobian of the system (￿1;￿2) is strictly positive. Therefore, ds￿=d￿ =
(@￿2=@z￿)=D < 0.
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